Rome and the conquest of the Iberian Northwest
Much has been written, and is still being written, regarding the conquest of the Iberian Northwest. Until a few years ago, just about all reconstructions of the Roman conquest of this area were based on literary sources, most of which were written a long time after the actual events. Some scholars, like Ronald Syme, are still unavoidable references in this topic. In those interpretations, archaeological data was barely used, or only served the purpose of corroborating historical accounts. In recent decades the archaeological record has grown both in quantity and in quality. In addition, fresh perspectives have provided a new approach to these events, less centered on military episodes and more focused on Rome’s strategy for gaining total control over the land and its peoples.
The time frame which ancient sources provide for this conquest is the years 29-19 BC, the Cantabrian Wars, and more specifically the years 26-25, that saw the fiercest campaigns and which determined the ultimate Roman victory. Augustus himself, and his closest aides, including Agrippa, played a key role in those years. With the arrival of pax in the year 19, the doors of the temple of Janus closed, indicating the war was over. But the end of military campaigns and hostilities was only part of a much longer process of conquest and submission. On the one hand, since the end of the 2nd century BC Rome had made itself militarily present both overland and by sea. The most celebrated ones, such as that of Junius Brutus Callaicus or Julius Caesar himself, were only a select few of a much longer list. Indeed, Roman presence could be heavily felt in the periphery of the actual Republic, and in the coastal areas. On the other hand, with the war over, the territory began a long process of establishing control and ordering the land, recording resources and populations, and imposing the strategic interests of the state on the conquered. A land, which had become provincial, had to be exploited, as well as its population, now technically foreigners on Roman soil (peregrini).
The Edict of Augustus from El Bierzo (15 BC) is substantial proof of the efficiency with which Roman power imposed a new organization of territorial entities on the land and people, entities with an administrative and tributary function, the civitates, which streamlined the imposition of fiscal duties.
Attempting to read into the archaeological record the specific events of a short-term phase, the Cantabrian Wars, is haphazard. But the enormous changes which it belies are much better understood as expressions of the longer-term change which found its apex in the second half of the 1st century BC. Several aspects of that record bear witness to this, both in the instability which shakes the foundations of the indigenous culture, and the conspicuous presence of the Roman legions. Often, the great proportion of treasure troves from this period have been used as evidence of these changes, but far less attention has also been paid to similarly significant events such as settlement destructions and abandonments.
Naturally, detecting military installations is one of the most undeniable features of Roman imperialism. In recent years news of possible military camps in the Iberian Northwest has multiplied. Many are still little more than hints revealed by aerial photography or LiDAR, others have been archaeologically confirmed. Nevertheless few have been inserted within a wider landscape conception which may reveal the role they played in Roman expansion: organization of a conquered land.
Project IVGA is an attempt to overcome this deficiency. Two military camps have been studied: A Recacha, between the municipalities of Ibias and Navia de Suarna, and A Granda das Xarras, between Ibias and Candín. Our research group has carried this out with the previous experience in other areas which combined these military facilities with extensive gold mining, such as Valdemeda (Truchas, León), Mina da Presa (Penamacor, Castelo Branco, in Portugal); more recently also, Chá de Santa Marta (Láncara, Lugo) and along the river Alva (Coimbra, in Portugal).
Both A Granda das Xarras and A Recacha represent the Roman advance on the westernmost-end of the Cantabrian Mountains. Their location connects the Bierzo basin in the interior with the Cantabrian Sea (Bay of Biscay), in the north, using the valley of the Navia River. There is no proof of the direct association between these two camps and the campaign of 26-25 BC, but it is clear that they are associated with the initial territorial control of the area, both during the conquest and in the initial stages of domination. After this first pacification phase, the area’s resources began to be exploited, namely the gold mines.
The documented record indicates these camps were not permanent, but probably associated with specific seasons or campaigns. It is possible that they were used for training, since these encampments normally lacked solid constructions inside, as only tents were used. Also, the fortification is scarce, lacking any significant defensive capacity. These camps could have a use that could range from one night to several weeks.
There are less than 2 km between A Granda das Xarras and A Recacha, which may indicate a complementary use during the military operations that secured the communications between the Sil and Navia river valleys.